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Has the Pennsylvania Superior Court Misread
Terry & Adams?
Robert Berkley Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Governmental intrusion into individual freedom and privacy
encompasses a wide spectrum of activity. Perhaps the most con-
spicuous instrusions are encounters between law enforcement of-
ficers and citizens.' These encounters range from friendly con-
versation or minor instruction, such as a casual request that an
individual pause and answer questions,' to arrest, intensive inter-
rogation, and search and seizure of property. The permissible
* Assistant Professor of Law, B.S. University of Pittsburgh, 1962, J.D.
University of Pittsburgh, 1971. Police Legal Advisor for the City of Pittsburgh
1971-1972.
1. "It is commonly believed that policemen spend most of their time
tracking down criminals. This, however, is a misconception. The police function
which is least obvious to the public (although it is the most visible), is that of
crime prevention, which absorbs most of the typical patrolman's day. He is on
duty primarily not to solve crimes (this is largely the task of specialized investi-
gative policemen, such as detectives), but to intimidate potential criminals. His
mere presence will often be sufficient to accomplish the purpose; when it is not,
and he notices a person whose behavior gives ground for suspicion that criminal
activity may be afoot, the careful officer will investigate. He Will, at least, keep
an eye on the suspicious person, and perhaps follow him" Landynski, The
Supreme Court's Search For Fourth Amendment Standards: The Problem of
Stop-And-Frisk, 45 CONN B.J. 146, 147-48 (1971).
2. With regard to observations that the policy may initiate "mere conver-
sation" without any evidentiary basis for suspicion, consider the following:
Of course any individual has a right to approach any other individual ....
But it is not quite the same when the police stop someone. There is
authority in the approach of the police, and command in their tone. I can
ignore the ordinary person, but can I ignore the police?
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162
(1966). Another author observed that:
Although some courts have equated police questioning with the exercise
of the ordinary citizen's rights to ask questions of others, police inquiries
within the scope of the criminal law enforcement function should not be
considered in such a simplistic manner because of the possibility of future
intrusion and the citizen's lack of choice in deciding whether to respond.
Comment, The Gradation of Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Context of
Street Detentions: People v. DeBour, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 427 (1977).
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scope of these encounters is determined by the Supreme Court
and other courts of the United States through a case-by-case in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment. The guidelines thus estab-
lished are sometimes less than clear from the point of view of
lesser courts, which must enforce the judicial rulings, and partic-
ularly from the point of view of police officers, who must live ac-
cording to them, giving rise to confusion and sometimes depar-
tures from the premise of the fourth amendment.
3
Some fifteen years have elapsed since the United States Su-
preme Court rendered its decision in Terry v. Ohio.4 In Terry
the Court approved the long-standing police practice of "stop and
frisk", wherein suspects are stopped for interrogation and some-
times searched for a weapon on less than probable cause.5 Al-
though Terry and its companion cases' provide some guidance
about when a police officer may physically intrude into one's pri-
vacy, many questions relating to police-citizen encounters remain
unanswered
3. Any major intrusion of a citizen would come within the protection of
the fourth amendment which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was designed to protect both in-
nocent and guilty persons "from unreasonable intrusions upon their right of pri-
vacy while leaving adequate room for the necessary processes of law enforce-
ment." Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709 (1948).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27. The practice of frisking was recognized
at common law, and was an established practice well before Terry. See L. TIF-
FANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBURG, DETECTION OF CRIME 45-48 (1967); Frang,
Stop and Frisk: The Issue Unresolved, 49 J. URB. L. 733, 740-42 (1972); Stern,
Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 532 (1967).
6. Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, reported together at 392
U.S. 49 (1968), were decided by the Supreme Court the same day as Terry. For
a discussion of all three cases, as well as the Court's opinion, see LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 47-50 (1968).
7. "Among the unresolved questions were: whether facts not amounting
to probable cause could justify an 'investigatory seizure' or 'forcible stop' short
of an arrest; what behavior by the police officer transforms a forcible stop into
an arrest requiring probable cause to effectuate it; and perhaps most important,
whether the constitutional standard for a forcible stop is different, and if so in
what respect, than the standard for a stop-and-frisk." Caracappa, Terry v. Ohio
and the Power of Police to Accost Citizens Absent Probable Cause to Arrest: A
[Vol. 20:585
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Recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court have ap-
proved police actions that arguably impinge on citizens' fourth
amendment rights and freedoms. The device by which the court
has approved this extended authority is apparently an expansive
reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. Williams!
The superior court's interpretation of Adams has effected a new
exception to the fourth amendment and has granted law enforce-
ment officers in Pennsylvania powers greater than those of
police officers in any other jurisdiction in the United States.,
The purpose of this article is to identify the serious erosion of
fourth amendment rights resulting from recent holdings of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. It begins with a discussion trac-
ing the development of Terry and Adams at both the state and
federal levels. This is followed by an examination of several
cases in which the superior court has expanded the rationale of
Terry and Adams to grant law enforcement officers extended
authority. The change in fourth amendment rights brought about
by these decisions is then discussed, and the article concludes
with recommendations for this area of Pennsylvania criminal
justice.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND RELATING TO STREET
ENCOUNTERS
A. Probable Cause and Other Requirements
Every person has a fundamental interest in limiting those cir-
cumstances under which the sanctity of his person and personal
effects may be disturbed by governmental intrusion.10 The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted to in-
Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Experience, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 499, 505 (1978).
The questions of forcible stop and frisks will not be discussed in this article.
For a discussion of this area, see; Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to
Stop a Citizen, 12 CRIM. L. BUL. 544 (1976); Caracappa, supra; Miles, From
Terry to Mimms: the Unacknowledged Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tions Surrounding Police-Citizen Confrontations, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127
(1978); Oberly, The Policemen's Duty and the Law Pertaining to Citizen En-
counters, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 653 (1981); Frang, supra; Comment, In re H.B.:
An Unfortunate Expansion of the Power to Stop and Frisk, 32 RUTGERS L.
REV. 118 (1979); Note, People v. DeBour: The Power of Police to Stop and
Frisk Citizens, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893 (1979).
8. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). For a thorough analysis of the Adams decision, see
the Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 171-81 (1972).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
10. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-33 (1967).
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sulate persons, both innocent and guilty, from unreasonable and
unwarranted instrusions by the government into their personal
privacy." The Supreme Court has determined that the fourth
amendment is applicable to state governments as well as to the
federal government through operation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' 2
Situations arise, however, where the government's interest in
violating a person's privacy outweighs that person's constitu-
tional right to remain undisturbed.'" Such situations are mani-
fested by the issuance of .a warrant for search or for seizure in
accordance with the constitutional standard of probable cause. 4
Searches undertaken without leave of warrant are presumptively
unreasonable,' 5 except in those limited circumstances where inci-
dent to a lawful arrest"6 or where undertaken to prevent the de-
struction of evidence." Searches conducted pursuant to the valid
consent of the person searched are not within the scope of the
fourth amendment.'8 The fourth amendment requires that a
"neutral and detached magistrate" issue the warrant, thereby in-
suring judicial rather than police control over the process.'9
11. See supra note 3.
12. The exclusionary rule, made applicable to the federal courts in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), has been described as putting teeth into the fourth amendent.
See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30
Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem
-Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary
Rule, 1 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 36 (1973).
13. Courts have determined that crime prevention and police safety are
public necessities that may warrant an infringement of individual privacy. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
(right to privacy must yield to societal concern from crime prevention).
14. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (warrantless search of
hotel room after smelling narcotics unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S 347 (1967) (warrantless wiretap constitutional).
15. See supra note 14.
16. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
17. In warrantless searches made incident to arrest, the police may search
both for weapons and to "seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction." Id. at 763.
18. Valid consent will permit a citizen to waive constitutional rights. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
19. In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), the Court stated
that a magistrate authorized to issue warrants is required to satisfy two tests.
"He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining
whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." Id. at 350.
588 [Vol. 20:585
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The standard of probable cause must be satisfied as a prere-
quisite to every search that is conducted without the consent of
the person searched. 0 It represents a balance between the indi-
vidual's right to be free from unreasonable interference with his
privacy and the state's duty to control crime."1 Probable cause
has been variously defined, but it ususally exists if, at the mo-
ment of arrest or search, the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the suspect has committed a crime or that evidence of a
crime is located at the place to be searched.' The probable cause
rule is a practical, nontechnical concept affording the best
method for accommodating the interests of both the individual
and the state.
Adherence to the requirements of probable cause and a warrant
is encouraged by the exclusionary rule, which is a rule of evidence
adopted by the Supreme Court whereby evidence obtained in con-
travention of the fourth amendment is inadmissible against the
person whose rights have been violated.23 The purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is to protect persons from unreasonable searches
and seizures conducted under the guise of law.24 Recognizing that
constitutional rights are not self-enforcing, the Court imple-
mented the exclusionary rule to compel respect for the fourth
20. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest on
probable cause is constitutional).
21. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
22. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Beck v. Ohio 379 U.S.
89 (1964); Draper v. United Sates, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
23. The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court held that evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment was illegally obtained and was therefore inadmissible in fed-
eral court. Id. at 398. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (exclu-
sionary rule applied to search by state officers).
For a comprehensive discussion of the exclusionary rule and its history, see
McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15
ARIZ. L. REV. 327 (1973); Oaks, supra note 12. See generally, 1 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 1.1-1.11(1978); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT; A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 62-86 (1966).
. 24. In describing the importance of the exclusionary rule in Terry, the
Supreme Court stated that "experience has taught that it is the only effective
deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures would be
a mere 'form of words."' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
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amendment and other rights of citizens by removing the incen-
tive to disregard them.
B. Stop and Frisk
Prior to 1968, the requirement of probable cause was the mini-
mum standard by which police officers could seize a person.'5 But
there always have been situations within the scope of a police of-
ficer's duties that demand swift action predicated upon on-the-
spot observations by the patrolling officer. Historically, these ac-
tions have not been, and as a practical matter could not be, sub-
ject to the warrant procedure. "Stop and frisk" refers to the
time-honored police procedure of stopping suspicious persons for
questioning on less than probable cause to arrest and, when ne-
cessary, searching them for dangerous weapons.' As of 1968, few
courts or legislatures had approved the practice, but neither had
they disapproved it.' To give credibility to the practice, several
states, including New York, adopted statutes providing for police
actions based on less than probable cause, whereby an officer
could briefly stop a citizen and investigate for weapons.28
The practice of stop and frisk was first addressed by the
United States Supreme Court in 1968 in the, landmark Terry-
Sibron-Peters trilogy.' In Terry v. Ohio the Court validated the
25. Terry represents the first judicial recognition of an exception to the
probable cause seizure of a person. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208-09 (1979).
26. LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 40-47.
27. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 23, at § 9.1. The power to stop and frisk was
granted to officers in Pennsylvania by court decisions. See Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 5, 223 A.2d 873, 876 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 434
Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
28. In 1964, the State of New York adopted a statute entitled "Temporary
questioning of persons in public places; search for weapons." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1973). The New York statutory procedure was immedi-
ately dubbed "stop and frisk." Several states in addition to New York enacted
stop and frisk statutes prior to Terry. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902
(1953); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98 (Michie/Law Coop 1966).
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Although the Terry trilogy represents the first in-
stance where the United States Supreme Court expressly determined the
validity of temporary detention based on less than probable cause, the issue
arose in an earlier decision. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178-79
(1949) (Burton, J., concurring). The Court had originally agreed to hear a fourth
case which involved the question of the legality of a stop alone, apart from a
frisk, on less than probable cause to arrest, but dismissed the writ of certiorari
590 [Vol. 20:585
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investigative tool of stop and frisk, permitting the limited search
of an individual for weapons despite a lack of probable cause.'
The Court made it clear that a stop and frisk is a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment,' but nevertheless sanc-
tioned its use on less than probable cause. The standard enuni-
cated by the Court was the reasonableness of the action under
the totality of the circumstances; the officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded,
and more importantly, from which a reasonable man would have
concluded, that the intrusion was warranted.2
The Terry Court applied a balancing test to determine the rea-
sonableness of the governmental actions, balancing governmental
interests in crime detection and officer safety against the individ-
ual's right to personal security and freedom from arbitrary gov-
ernmental interference. The Court concluded that "there must be
a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer" in spite of the
absence of probable cause.' Hence, it appears that reasonable-
ness has replaced probable cause as the standard required to
justify an intrusion where that intrusion qualifies as a stop and
frisk."
as improvidently granted. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598
(1968) (per curiam).
30. 392 U.S. at 26-28. In its formal sense a frisk involves contact or patting of
the outer clothing of a person to detect by sense of touch whether a concealed
weapon is being carried. If, during the course of a justifiable stop, the officer
reasonably fears for his own, or another's, safety he may conduct a limited pat-
down of the detained person's outer clothing to discover and remove weapons.
Id.
31. 392 U.S. at 16.
32. Id. at 30-31. The Court stated:
[Wihere a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reason-
ably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protec-
tion of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.
Id.
33. 392 U.S. at 30.
34. Although never expressly used by the Terry majority, "resonable su-
spicion" became the term associated with the quantum of evidence that the
1982]
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At the time Terry was decided the Supreme Court ruled on
two other cases involving encounters between persons and police
officers. In Sibron v. New York,35 the Court demonstrated the
boundaries of the Terry holding by finding a police officer's stop
and frisk to be unreasonable. The police officer in Sibron observed
a suspect speaking with several known narcotics addicts. Later,
the officer approached the suspect in a restaurant and asked him
to step outside, where the officer said, "You know what I am
after." At that point, according to the officer, Sibron "mumbled
something and reached into his pocket." Simultaneously, the of-
ficer reached into the same pocket and pulled out several packets
of heroin." The Court held that the search was unlawful because
the officer was seeking narcotics rather than acting out of fear
for his safety, and because, in any event, the officer had not
followed the necessary procedure for a frisk for weapons. 7
Peters v. New York, 8 also released with Terry, similarly dealt
with the scope of the Terry opinion. In Peters the officer made a
reasonable, probable cause stop and patted down the suspect in a
search for weapons. Feeling a hard object in the suspect's pocket
that he thought might be a gun, the officer reached in and re-
moved an opaque plastic envelope that contained burglar's
tools. 39 The Court concluded that there was no reason to consider
the officer's right to stop and frisk because he had made an ar-
rest on probable cause and thus could search the suspect in
order to find weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence."
Adams v. Williams4 is the most recent stop and frisk decision
Court found necessary to conduct a stop and frisk. The term "reasonable suspi-
cion" was first used by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). He wrote: "Under the decison in Terry a right to
stop may indeed be premised on reasonable suspicion and does not require
probable cause .... " Id. at 71 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Landynski, supra
note 1, at 181 n.115.
35. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 65.
38. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
39. Id. at 65.
40. Id. at 66. Each of the cases of this trilogy-Sibron, Terry and Peters-
involved a different quantitative amount of evidence. In Sibron, the officer had
no significant evidence with which to justify an intrusion; in Terry, there ex-
isted suspicious circumstances, though not probable cause, giving rise to an in-
termediate level of intrusion; in Peters, there existed probable cause, justifying
a full search.
41. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
[Vol. 20:585
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of the United States Supreme Court. In that case the Court re-
versed a decision" of the court of appeals and upheld the validity
of a stop and frisk prompted by an unverified tip alleging that a
man in a nearby parked car possessed narcotics and carried a
gun at his waist.43 The Court ruled that under the Terry doctrine
the tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the officer's actions."'
However, the Court qualified its approval of the use of an in-
formant's tip to initiate a stop and frisk by carefully noting that
(1) the informer was personally known to the officer and had pro-
vided reliable tips in the past; (2) the officer was alone late at
night in a high crime area; and (3) under applicable state law, the
informant was subject to immediate arrest for making a false
report if the officer's stop and frisk proved the tip to be false.45
The majority in Adams ruled that the search was a proper
frisk for the safety of the police officer, placing great emphasis
on the facts of the case.46 The Court noted that when the officer
ordered the defendant to step out of the car, the defendant did
not comply, but instead rolled down his car window. Thus, the
gun reported to be at the defendant's waist became a greater
threat to the officer. Hence, the officer's action in reaching to the
spot where the gun was reportedly hidden constituted a limited
intrusion designed to insure the officer's safety."
Taken as a whole, the Court's stop and frisk decisions do not
stand for the proposition that a seizure is justified based on the
reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. There must be a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable suspi-
cion that the person being investigated is armed and dangerous,
and thereby poses a threat to the immediate safety of the officer
or some other individual.48 The reasonableness of an officer's su-
spicion is determined by an objective standard of whether the in-
42. Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
43. 407 U.S. at 149.
44. Id. at 146-47. In Adams, the informant was personally known to the
police officer. Id. A known informant is considered to be more reliable than an
anonymous informant because the known informant can be subject to criminal
liability for falsely reporting an incident. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
45. 407 U.S. at 146-48.
46. Id. at 148.
47. Id.
48. Forceful Terry stops may not be made on mere suspicion, inarticulable
hunches or simple good faith. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 63-65.
1982] 593
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formation obtained by the officer is such as would persuade a
reasonable man that the action taken was proper.49
III. THE INTERMEDIATE RESPONSE CONCEPT
The Adams majority, Mr. Justice Rehnquist speaking for six
members of the Court, indicated in a dictum interpretation of the
Terry doctrine that an officer is not restricted to a choice be-
tween a valid probable cause arrest and inaction which may
"allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape."' Instead, an of-
ficer having an adequate basis for suspecting that a crime has oc-
curred or will occur may adopt an "intermediate response" by
making "a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to deter-
mine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information . . . ."' Reading Adams in view
of this language, it might be argued that the Court has extended
Terry from its original purpose of crime prevention and protec-
tion of the officer to that of crime detection as well. 2 Facing a di-
verse selection of encounters between police officers and citi-
zens, lower courts have struggled in their efforts to apply the
few stop and frisk principles established thus far by the Su-
preme Court. As will be shown, it is unfortunate, in light of more
recent cases, that the Adams majority found it necessary to
stray from the careful language used by the Terry Court in for-
mulating a limited exception to the constitutional requirement of
probable cause.
The Pennslyvania Supreme Court has consistently followed
Terry, as interpreted by the court in Commonwealth v. Hicks.'
In Hicks, the supreme court said that "if probable cause to arrest
49. 392 U.S. at 24. The Court in Terry stated: "When an officer is justified
in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others," he
may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons. Id.
50. 407 U.S. at 145. The Adams Court stated: "The Fourth Amendment
does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information
necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow
a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." Id.
51. 407 U.S. at 146 (citing Terry).
52. Id. at 145 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). The Adams court quoted: "'a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is not probable cause to make an arrest."' Id.
53. 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
594 [Vol. 20:585
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is absent, the police may still legitimately seize a person ... and
conduct a limited search of the individual's outer clothing .... "5
The court added, however, that the officer must "observe un-
usual and suspicious conduct on the part of the individual" which
leads the -officer reasonably to conclude that criminal activity is
afoot and that the person with whom the officer is dealing may be
armed and dangerous.' In so holding, the Hicks court followed
closely the language of the Supreme Court in Terry.'
Four years after Hicks, the intermediate response doctrine of
Adams. was apparently approved in dictum by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in an obscure footnote in the case of Common-
wealth v. Pegram 7 In Pegram, the conviction of the defendant
was overturned because the court found an absence of probable
cause for the defendant's arrest. The court also determined that
there were no facts from which one could have concluded that
the defendant was either armed or dangerous, and therefore the
search conducted by the officers was without lawful justification.
Hence, the bare statement in the Pegram footnote regarding an
intermediate response was dictum susceptible only to the limited
interpretation that an officer has a right to stop citizens under
certain undefined circumstances that fall short of probable cause.
As will become evident from the discussion which follows, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has evolved an intermediate re-
sponse doctrine that far exceeds in scope any reasonable inter-
pretation of the authoritative case law heretofore discussed.
IV. THE SUPERIOR COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
"INTERMEDIATE RESPONSE"
As Professor Wayne LaFave once observed "it is clear that in
the years ahead one of the major tasks of the courts will be to
flesh out the evidentiary standards for temporary investigative
seizures. ' The Pennsylvania Superior Court, through its fourth
54. Id. at 158, 253 A.2d at 279.
55. Id. at 158-59, 253 A.2d at 279.
56. Id. at 160, 253 A.2d at 280.
57. 450 Pa. 590, 301 A.2d 695 (1973).
58. LaFave, supra note 6, at 67. "Police authority to investigate suspicious
activity should be conferred in terms of the power to make a temporary
seizure; concomitantly, the courts should become more vigilant in striking down
other investigative techniques which are more offensive." Id. at 124.
19821
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amendment decisions, is now developing standards of conduct for
police officers in the investigation of alleged criminal activity.
Recent decisions by the court involving such police activity as
stop and frisk, suspect relocation, and search and seizure have
witnessed the approval of intrusive conduct on the authority of
an intermediate response doctrine, a doctrine created by the su-
perior court and based loosely on the somewhat dubious lan-
guage in Adams referring to an "intermediate response." It is
suggested, however, that Adams must be interpreted in a man-
ner consistent with Terry, inasmuch as Terry was deemed to be
controlling case law by the Adams Court, and, hence, that any
reading of the intermediate response language as an authoriza-
tion for more intrusive conduct is at odds with authoritative in-
terpretations of the fourth amendment.
A. Stop and Frisk
The original standard for stop and frisk, that of a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, has developed into a lesser stan-
dard in Pennsylvania. The most recent modification of the stan-
dard is found in the superior court case of Commonwealth v.
Sheridan,59 decided in 1981, where a stop and frisk was approved
by the court on a standard less exacting than that of reasonable
suspicion. 0
The facts of Sheridan were that at 3:00 a.m. on March 19, 1979,
a Philadelphia police officer stopped a suspect to inquire into his
activities. This stop was made within two or three minutes after
receipt of a radio dispatch requesting that officers search for a
black male, five feet, eight inches tall, wearing a white raincoat
and a cap. The suspect was a black man, about five feet, eight
inches tall and was wearing a tan overcoat and no hat.6 The
record shows that the street was deserted at the time of the inci-
dent, except for the presence of the suspect. Twice the police of-
ficer directed inquiries to the suspect and each time the suspect
did not respond. As a result, the officer conducted a frisk of the
59. 292 Pa. Super. 278, 437 A.2d 44 (1981).
60. Id. at 279, 437 A.2d at 45.
61. Id. The Court also stated that the defendant's silence in response to
the officer's inquiries raised the level of suspicion which ultimately justified the
officer's search. Id. at 46.
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suspect and found a .32 caliber revolver. A further search revealed
two wallets, one of which belonged to the victim whose report
led to the transmission of the radio dispatch.2
The majority of the superior court found that the initial stop
and questioning of the defendant was a valid intermediate re-
sponse, justified by the defendant's general similarity in appear-
ance to the description communicated to the officer, combined
with the absence of other persons on the street at that early
morning hour.1 The court's rationale, however, is not consistent
with the standards ascribed for a stop and frisk in Terry and
Adams. The police officer in Terry personally observed the sus-
pects' suspicious activities for "an extended period of time" be-
fore approaching them." The Adams Court placed great empha-
sis on the specificity and reliability of the imformant's tip which
led to the encounter in that case." In Sheridan, however, the
suspect was a black man of average height who did not other-
wise match a comparatively general description issued by the
radio dispatch. The mere fact that the suspect was one of few
persons on the street at the time of the crime is not a valid basis
for the stop unless the police officer had some reason to believe
that the person sought after was travelling by foot rather than
some other, perhaps more likely, means of transportation.
Without a more sound basis for the officer's stop of the defen-
dant, the court's approval of the act grants the police a license to
stop almost any person on foot within the vicinity of a crime.
The Sheridan court also concluded that the search of the de-
fendant was consistent with the standard set forth in Terry, bas-
ing the conclusion on a warning in the radio dispatch that the
suspect may be armed and on the defendant's failure to respond
to the officer's questions.6 There was no showing in Sheridan
that the officer reasonably feared for his safety and was thus
justified in frisking the suspect. In essence, then, the validity of
the stop was sufficient to justify the search-a result which is in-
consistent with the Terry doctrine as well as the more demand-
ing requirement of probable cause.
62. 292 Pa. Super. at 279, 437 A.2d at 46.
63. Id.
64. 392 U.S. at 23.
65. See supra text accompanying note 45.
66. 292 Pa. Super. at 284, 437 A.2d at 47.
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B. Relocation of Persons
In Terry, the Supreme Court authorized a limited exception to
the probable cause requirement whereby a police officer may
stop and frisk a suspect, provided, in retrospect, the officer is
able to point to specific and articulable facts which would war-
rant a reasonable person in the belief that the intrusion was jus-
tified." In Adams, the Court characterized the Terry exception
as an intermediate response, whereby police officers may make a
"brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo .... "' The Pennsylvania
Superior Court, without further incentive from an authoritative
court, has used the passing reference to an intermediate re-
sponse as aospringboard to expand the Terry doctrine to include
intrusions by police officers which are clearly beyond the in-
tended scope of Terry. Such is the result of two recent cases
wherein the court permitted the relocation of suspects for fur-
ther investigation subsequent to their initial stop on grounds
amounting to less than probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Harper,9 a police officer learned from
passengers on a trolley that three individuals involved in a
brutal stabbing had boarded a bus across the street. The officer
boarded the identified bus and discovered six men who fit the
general descriptions of the suspects. Unable to identify the three
offenders, the officer forced all six men and another individual
from the street to accompany him to the hospital, where each
suspect was paraded individually before the victim for identifica-
tion. 0 The defendant was identified by the victim as one of the
attackers.
Without reference to Terry, Adams, or the intermediate re-
sponse doctrine, the superior court concluded that the police of-
ficer's conduct in "momentarily detaining" the seven suspects
was reasonable under the circumstances." The court found the ex-
istence of probable cause to believe that the perpetrators of the
crime were on the bus to be significant, as well as the heinous
nature of the crime involved, and "the small number of suspects"
67. 392 U.S. at 21-22.
68. 407 U.S. at 146.
69. 248 Pa. Super. 344, 375 A.2d 129 (1977).
70. Id. at 346-47, 375 A.2d at 130-31.
71. Id. at 348, 375 A.2d at 131.
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detained." The court did not address that fact that at least four
innocent persons were knowingly detained and transported
against their will from the scene of the crime.
Harper looms as a major extension of the stop and frisk case
law. Both Terry and Adams involved individual suspects and
police activity that occurred at the place of the stop. In Harper
the police officer detained seven individuals with the knowledge
that at least half were not involved in the criminal activity, and
transported all seven detainees from the point of original deten-
tion to a hospital.
The superior court again faced the issue of suspect relocation in
the case of Commonwealth v. Lovette. 3 A policeman in that case
observed three males with mud and dirt on their shoes standing
on a street corner approximately one and one-half blocks from
the scene of a burglary. He had obtained information that the
perpetrators of the crime had crossed a rain-soaked backyard
some twenty-five minutes before. The officer approached the
three men, questioned them, and after deciding that their an-
swers were evasive, transported the trio to the scene to deter-
mine if the burglary victim could identify a hat in the possession
of one of the defendants." Prior to placing the men in the police
wagon, the officer conducted a "pat-down" search which revealed
that one of the individuals possessed a ring and a silver dime
with numismatic value. The three items were subsequently iden-
tified by the complainant, whereupon the three men were ar-
rested and taken to the police station."
The Lovette court approved the actions of the police officer as
those of a proper intermediate response. 6 By so holding, the
court sustained conduct which exceeds the authority granted to
police officers by Terry and its companion cases with respect
both to the search and to relocation of the suspects. A first ques-
72. Id.
73. 271 Pa. Super. 250, 413 A.2d 390 (1979).
74. Id. at 253, 413 A.2d at 391.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 254, 413 A.2d at 392. Courts of other jurisdictions also have ap-
proved the relocation of suspects to the scene of the crime on less than prob-
able cause. See People v. Gatch, 56 Cal. App. 3d 505, 128 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1976);
In re Lynette G., 54 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 126 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1965); State v. Byers,
85 Wash. 2d 783, 539 P.2d 833 (1975); State v. Isham, 70 Wis. 2d 718, 235
N.W.2d 506 (1975).
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tion is whether the search was validly initiated, inasmuch as it is
not evident from the court's discussion that the suspects posed a
threat to the officer's safety. Second, it appears that the scope of
the search conducted does not comport with the Terry doctrine.
By approving the acquisition by the officer of the ring and the
silver dime, the court extended the permissible scope of a stop
and frisk search beyond "a limited patting of the outer clothing
of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as in-
struments of assault."77 The Lovette court also reaffirmed and
extended the right, established in Harper, of police officers to
relocate citizens. The court reaffirmed the tool of relocation as a
valid intermediate response and permitted the relocation without
a showing that the victim was unable to attend the scene of de-
tention, as was the case with the stabbing victim in Harper."8
Even disregarding the absence of authority in Terry or Adams
for the relocation of a suspect without probable cause, a more re-
cent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New
York"9 clearly suggests that no suspect may be transported in
the absence of probable cause. The defendant in Dunaway was
transported involuntarily to the police station for interrogation
and only subsequently arrested. The Court concluded that the
defendant's "detention for custodial interrogation" amounted to
an arrest in contravention of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights.' Thus, the weight of the case law strongly suggests that
relocation on less than probable cause is inconsistent with the
fourth amendment.81
77. 392 U.S. at 65.
78. 271 Pa. Super. at 253-254, 413 A. 2d at 392. On appeal the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed and awarded the defendant a new trial. Common-
wealth v. Lovette, - Pa. .. 450 A.3d 975 (1982). Writing for the majority,
Justice Nix ruled that placing the defendant and his companions in the police
vehicle and transporting them to the scene without their consent constituted an
arrest as traditionally defined in Pennsylvania. Id. at 978. Finding no probable
cause to make such an arrest, the court could not conclude "that the instant
seizure [of the person of the defendant] is so clearly within the Terry exception
as to warrant a deviation in this case from this jurisdiction's longstanding rule
of arrest based on probable cause." Id. at 980.
79. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
80. Id. at 213.
81. The issue of relocation of a criminal suspect was addressed by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536,
540 P.2d 632 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). In Harris the police trans-
ported the defendant to the scene of a crime for further interrogation and possi-
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C. Search of A Home With Less Than Probable Cause.
In Commonwealth v. Daniels,82 the superior court approved
the entry and search of a home, notwithstanding the absence of
probable cause or even facts supporting a search under Terry. In
Daniels, police officers approached an apartment to investigate an
anonymous phone call in which it was reported that a screaming
female had been taken from a car into the apartment. 3 When the
defendant answered the door, the officers questioned him about
the report. The defendant did not respond to the questions, but
instead walked away from the open apartment door. The officers
followed the defendant into the apartment and then into his bed-
room, where they discovered in plain view a box of plastic bags
"containing a tan substance, later identified as heroin.""
The court concluded that the officers made a valid entry into
Daniels' apartment based on Daniels' consent, or, because the
consent issue was not clear, alternatively on Daniels' "criminally
suspicious conduct [in walking away from the door], viewed in
light of the anonymous phone call."8 Noting that "[tlhe Terry
line of cases has been expanded in Pennsylvania to include an 'in-
termediate response' applicable to circumstances where facts
may not warrant an arrest,"" the court further concluded that
the officers adopted a proper intermediate response by following
Daniels into his bedroom. 7 The court determined that it was ne-
cessary for the officers, in seeking to question Daniels, to follow
him into his bedroom, where the contraband came into plain
ble identification. The supreme court found this to be an arrest and determined
that probable cause was required for this police action. The court did not con-
clude that all relocations of a criminal suspect to the scene of a crime are uncon-
stitutional, but that where the officer has a viable alternative, relocation is not
a reasonable course.
82. 280 Pa. Super. 278, 421 A.2d 721 (1980).
83. Id. at 280, 421 A.2d 722. The caller identified himself as a third floor
tenant of the same building. Id. The problems associated with use of anonymous
tips are well documented. See Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703
(1972); Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time Informer, 43 U. COLO. L. REV.
357 (1972); Note, State v. Gerber: Credibility of the Anonymous Informant, 22
S.D.L. REV. 222 (1977).
84. 280 Pa. Super. at 280, 421 A.2d at 722.
85. Id. at 283, 421 A.2d at 742.
86. Id. at 284, 421 A.2d at 724.
87. Id. at 285, 421 A.2d at 725.
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view.8 In further support of its decision, the court balanced the
competing interests of an individual and the state and decided
that the state's interest in encouraging active police investiga-
tion should prevail. 9
In Terry, the Court recognized that there are occasions when
police must inquire into possible criminal activity in spite of the
absence of probable cause to support an arrest." Even so, the
Court preserved the individual's fourth amendment right to free-
dom from unreasonable governmental encroachment upon the pri-
vacy of his person and his home. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court, however, has broadened the scope of Terry and Adams
by authorizing a police officer to enter a home and investigate
suspected criminal activity. In Terry and Adams the reasonable
expectations of privacy violated by the searches were less than
that associated with the sanctity of a person's home."'
The Daniels court also reduced the level of showing required
to justify an intrusion. In Terry the officer was acting on first-
hand observations92 and in Adams the officer knew the inform-
ant, but the police in Daniels were acting on information re-
ceived from an anonymous source. The court held that although
the tip was not sufficient to support an exception to the warrant
requirement, it was sufficient to support stopping and question-
ing the defendant and, in this case, entering the defendant's
home.95
In a concurring opinion in Terry, Justice White emphasized
that "the person stopped is not obliged to answer; answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation."" Despite the clear language of Justice White's con-
currence, the Pennsylvania Superior Court effectively has held
88. Id.
89. Id. at 284, 421 A.2d at 724.
90. 392 U.S. at 23.
91. The action in Terry occurred on the streets of Cleveland, Ohio, and the
confrontation in Adams occurred in an open parking lot.
92. 407 U.S. at 158-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 146.
94. 280 Pa. Super. at 280, 421 A.2d at 725.
95. Id. at 284, 421 A.2d at 724.
96. 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). See also Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979) (overturning conviction of defendant arrested for refusing to iden-
tify himself and explain what he was doing).
[Vol. 20:585
Terry & Adams
that a refusal to respond to an officer's questions empowers the
officer to act in a manner which was constitutionally prohibited
prior to the interrogation.
D. Seizure of Person and Property Based on
Reasonable Suspicion.
Terry and Adams recognized the duty of a police officer in
proper circumstances to approach a person in an appropriate man-
ner "for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior"
even in the absence of probable cause. 7 Such an investigative in-
trusion is appropriate, however, only where the officer reason-
ably believes that there exists a substantial possibility that crim-
inal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. The
Court in Terry and Adams focused on the reliability of the infor-
mation on which the officer based his intrusive act and concluded
that the act is justified only in circumstances where a person of
reasonable caution would agree that the act was justified. In no
case has the Court authorized intrusive acts on less than prob-
able cause without substantial justification. The superior court,
however, has apparently authorized intrusive governmental ac-
tion under a lesser standard of review than that set forth in
Terry and Adams.
In Commonwealth v. LeSeuer,98 police officers received a tip
that two men ran from a house carrying stereo equipment." The
officers stopped the two men to determine their identity and to
inquire about their reason for carrying five pieces of stereo
equipment. In response to the officers' questions, the defendant
stated that he was in route from a pawn shop where he had been
unsuccessful in an attempt to pawn the stereo equipment because
the turntable lacked a needle. Noting that the turntable had a
needle, the officers confiscated the stereo equipment and took
the defendant into custody. 00
The superior court concluded that the initial stop and question-
ing of LeSeuer was a valid intermediate response.101 Although the
97. 407 U.S. at 145 (quoting from Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
98. 252 Pa. Super. 498, 382 A.2d 127 (1977).
99. Id. at 500, 382 A.2d at 127. An unidentified elderly man waved the of-
ficer's vehicle down and stated that the defendant had just come running out of
a house carrying stereo equipment. Id.
100. 252 Pa. Super. at 500, 382 A.2d at 127-28.
101. Id. at 501, 382 A.2d at 128.
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court cites "the totality of the circumstances" as justifying the of-
ficers' reasonable belief "that criminal activity was afoot .. ,"0 in
fact the single circumstance giving rise to the action was the un-
substantiated observation that LeSeuer and another man ran
from a house. Even assuming that the officers were justified in
basing their action on the single accusation, the observation re-
lated to the officers did not accuse LeSeuer of a crime but mere-
ly of running from a house. In fact, once the police officers took
the defendant into custody and seized the property, the defen-
dant was released and given a property receipt for the equip-
ment because there was no report of a burglary in the neighbor-
hood."3 It was not until later that the officers learned that the
stereo equipment had been taken in a burglary, whereupon the
defendant was re-arrested. 104 Admittedly, LeSeuer's alleged act
may have seemed suspicious and probably warranted further in-
vestigation, but it did not justify the officers' act in seizing the
two men.0 5
Three judges dissented in two separate opinions to the majori-
ty's position in LeSeuer. Even the dissenters, however, did not
make an issue of the fact that the officers had no information
that a crime had occurred. The major difference between the dis-
senters and the majority relates to the extent of the questioning
.that should have occurred prior to taking the defendant and the
property into custody."6 Thus, both the dissenting judges and
the majority agreed that stopping and questioning persons as a
result of their transportation of property in an unusual manner
is a proper police practice.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 500, 382 A.2d at 128.
104. Id.
105. See 392 U.S. at 16.
106. See 251 Pa. Super. at 502-07, 382 A.2d at 128-31. Judge Spaeth criticiz-
ed the majority as follows:
There was no need for the police to act as they did. They could have said,
'But the stereo has a needle in it,' .... [T]he police were only a few ques-
tions and a few minutes away from learning enough to be able to decide,
either to release appellant ... or to arrest him because the questions ask-
ed him had elicited a story "bizarre and totally incredible . . . under all
the facts and circumstances." . . . Instead of taking that little trouble, the
police drove appellant off to the station house-just the response that
Terry and Adams make unnecessary, and preclude."
Id. at 507, 382 A.2d at 231.
[Vol. 20:585
Terry & Adams
V. THE SUPERIOR COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF
INTERMEDIATE RESPONSE
It follows from the foregoing discussion that, broadly speaking,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court has narrowed the scope of pro-
tection offered by the fourth amendment in three general areas.
First, the court has reduced the level of showing necessary to
justify a stop and a search below the standards delineated in
Terry and Adams, thereby broadening the state's scope of author-
ity to intrude into the lives of all persons in a quest for those who
have violated the law. In LeSeuer, the court sanctioned the stop
and subsequent seizure of the defendant, and property in the de-
fendant's possession, in the absence of any evidence that the de-
fendant had committed a crime or even that a crime had been
committed.' °7 In Daniels, the duty of police officers to seek an-
swers to their questions was found by the court to be a sufficient
basis for the search of the defendant's home in the absence of a
warrant and probable cause. ' 8 The Sheridan court determined
that the defendant's failure to respond to an officer's question
justified the subsequent search of the defendant for weapons.' 9
Second, the court has expanded the permissible scope of a
Terry search beyond a limited, protective search for a conven-
tional weapon which might threaten the personal safety of the of-
ficer or other persons nearby. In Lovette, the court approved an
intermediate response by a police officer, including a search in
which the officer discovered and seized a ring and a dime, the
size and nature of which items clearly suggest a search of imper-
missible scope."'
Finally, the court has extended to police officers the authority
to transport suspects away from the point of the initial stop, on
less than probable cause, for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists for the suspects' arrest. In Harper, the
court approved the relocation of seven persons to a hospital so
that the victim of a stabbing might identify his three assailants.'
The court in Lovette found permissible the relocation of three
107. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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suspects to the scene of a burglary for possible identification of
items in the possession of the suspects."'
A court's reluctance to free an individual when he is clearly
guilty of a criminal offense is understandable. A court's refusal,
however, to sustain the fourth amendment rights of that individ-
ual, without regard to the nature of the offense, is not under-
standable. That refusal is itself an affront to the rights of all in-
dividuals. Where the standard of review used by the court to ap-
prove the state's conduct focuses primarily on an officer's subjec-
tive reactions, the effect is to insulate the state's conduct from
judicial review. What is more, in ridding society, probably only
temporarily, of one or two offenders, the court exposes society to
intrusions of the nature approved by the convictions. These
governmental intrusions will infringe the constitutional freedoms
of innocent as well as criminal individuals and will thereby exacer-
bate the sometimes heated relations between police officers and
other members of society.
A. The New Intermediate Response Standards Will Lessen
Judicial Control of Police Conduct
Among the responsibilities of the judicial branch of the United
States government is that of interpreting the Constituion to de-
termine whether a given act by a governmental body is consist-
ent with constitutional limitations on that body. The standards
applied by courts in evaluating the constitutionality of the act
vary with the nature of the particular act. In the case of confronta-
tions between police officers and ordinary citizens, the Supreme
Court has included, at least to some extent, a note of objectivity
in the governing standard, whereby courts can place a meaning-
ful check on the occasional tendency of the government to ex-
ceed its authority as limited by the fourth amendment.'13 As the
governing standard gradually evolves elements of greater sub-
jectivity, courts are forced to rely more on the mere opinions of
police officers rather than on substantiating evidence, and the
meaningfulness of the judicial check on executive liberty is
diminished.
The new intermediate response doctrine promulgated recently
112. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
113. Comment, supra note 2, at 427.
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by the Pennsylvania Superior Court embodies a highly subjec-
tive standard by which street encounters between police officers
and ordinary citizens are to be evaluated. The effect of the su-
perior court decisions previously described has been the elimina-
tion of the reasonable man standard for nonforcible, though in-
trusive, searches and seizures. The standard established by the
superior court forces trial courts, when determining whether
police actions are reasonable, to give conclusive weight to the
subjective decisions of the police officers, in total disregard of
the substantiating evidence deemed significant in Terry and
Adams.' Hence, the absence of objectivity in the standard of re-
view inhibits the ability of the reviewing court to scrutinize ef-
fectively the scope of the governmental intrusion and to protect
the fourth amendment interests of persons confronted.
In the final analysis, Pennsylvania's intermediate response doc-
trine is a perversion of the fourth amendment as interpreted to
date by the United States Supreme Court. The ultimate effect of
the doctrine will be an increase in the number of confrontations
between police officers and citizens. Most of the encounters will
never be brought to the attention of the courts due to the ab-
sence of criminal conduct on the part of the citizen accosted.
Thus, in the case of most encounters, the intrusive conduct of the
police will escape the supervision and control of the judiciary.
Occasionally, an encounter will lead to an arrest and a court
will be faced with the issue of whether the defendant's fourth
amendment rights were violated so as to necessitate application
of the exclusionary rule. In most cases the intermediate response
doctrine will enable the officer to justify his conduct by refer-
ence to a tip from an informant whose identity must remain un-
disclosed, or by reference to the officer's duty to investigate, by
questioning or otherwise, suspicious behavior on the part of the
defendant. Because the officer will be judged by a subjective
standard, whatever his explanation, he often will be able to cir-
cumvent the obstacle presented by the fourth amendment."5
In addition to reducing the standard of review, the superior
court has broadened the circumstances in which police officers
may conduct an intermediate response. The court has permitted
114. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
115. See Comment, supra note 2, at 432.
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an intermediate response where an officer received an anony-
mous tip.11 The police, when pursuing such a tip, need no longer
establish the quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the Terry
test of reasonable suspicion. They can now rely on second-hand
information of unknown reliability when such information gener-
ally describes an identifiable suspect. Thus, the court has di-
verged significantly from the strict standards of Terry and
Adams'.. by failing to require testimony corroborating the exist-
ence of the tip beyond the testimony proffered by the arresting
officer. The superior court's decisions open the door to a poten-
tial increase in unreasonable police actions which permit inno-
cent citizens to be frisked, and possibly arrested, whenever an
anonymous tip alleges that a citizen has engaged in suspicious
activity or is carrying a weapon. An unethical police officer may
reasonably expect to succeed in justifying an illicit frisk or ar-
rest merely by making false claims that he received a dispatch
or an anonymous tip.
Finally, the adoption of the lesser intermediate response stan-
dard may encourage officers, in the absence of a more favorable
alternative, to justify their conduct by urging the court to find
that, once stopped, the defendant consented to the intrusion."8 In
addressing preliminarily the issue of consent, the court may
never reach the issue of the reasonableness of the invasion. Be-
cause the law does not require willing consent, but only the ab-
sence of overt coercion,"9 the intermediate response doctrine,
with its easily justified initial stop, is particularly sensitive to
abuse in this regard. Hence, once again the intermediate re-
116. In Commonwealth v. Daniels, the police officer's duty to question arose
form an anonymous telephone tip. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
117. However, the Court in Adams admitted that the informant's unverified
tip may have been insufficient for an arrest or search warant. 407 U.S. at 147,
(citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964)). Aguilar and Spinelli propose a two-pronged test by which a
magistrate can determine whether an arrest or search warrant should issue.
The informant must be shown to have been reliable in past dealings with the
police, and his information must provide a basis for concluding that the defen-
dant was engaged in criminal activity.
118. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). "While the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment limit the circumstances under which the police can
conduct a search, there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person voluntari-
ly allowing a search." Id. at 242-43. See also Preiser, Confrontations Initiated
By The Police On Less Than Probable Cause, 45 ALBANY L. REv. 57, 65 (1980).
119. 412 U.S. at 228.
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sponse effectively diminishes judicial control of stop and frisk
situations.
C. The New Standard Will Have an Adverse Effect on
Police-Community Relations
The recent decisions of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
have eliminated the Terry requirement that an intruding police
officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts such as
would justify a reasonable person in the belief that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot. The decisions suggest that the behavior on the
part of a suspect that will justify intrusive conduct by the officer
is that of any sufficiently suspicious activity, a standard which is
significantly reduced in objectivity from the Terry standard. One
may expect that the result of such a reduced standard will be an
increase in invasions of individual privacy.20 More citizens than
ever before will be subject to street encounters with police of-
ficers.
In United States v. Cortez,'21 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the circumstances that justify intrusions based on less
than probable cause; that is, what circumstances constitute a rea-
sonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The Court sug-
gested that police officers could accumulate their own reasonable
suspicions based on trained investigative activities. The Court also
determined that objective facts, meaningless to the untrained,
"can be combined with permissible deductions . . . to form a
legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person."" Hence,
Cortez affirms the Terry requirement that there be articulable
facts which give rise to the reasonableness of an officer's suspi-
cion.
The superior court, however, apparently has eliminated any
requirement that the officer be able to articulate specific facts in
the course of formulating a reasonable suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot. This follows from the elimination by the superior
court of informer reliability as a requisite in determining
whether a police officer has reasonable grounds to conduct a stop
and frisk. The Adams case suggests very strongly that the per-
sonal reliability or accountability of the informant remains an im-
120. Comment, supra note 2, at 409-10.
121. 101 S. Ct. at 695.
122. Id. at 695.
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portant ingredient in the total factual picture presented to the
officer as a prelude to a stop and frisk.'23 Yet, the superior court
ruled that a private citizen may be subject to a police stop, ques-
tioning, and frisk based solely on the vague and unsubstantiated
accusation of an anonymous tip."4 Such a result is not supported
by substantial judicial authority and ultimately risks an adverse
reaction in the minority communities of this nation as the
number of intrusive encounters rises.
An individual who is stopped on the street or in a public place
and frisked may be subjected to humiliation in front of his family,
friends, or neighbors. Being frisked is often a more emotional ex-
perience in minority communities, where police officers are often
of a different race than the majority of citizens in the commu-
nity. 25 For this reason, and because a stop and frisk represents
an invasion of individual privacy which is most often resented,
such encounters are one of the major causes of tension between
police and the community.'26 The reduction in standard effected
by the superior court will cause officers to react more often to
marginally unusual conduct'27 and the majority of these confron-
tations will involve members of minority groups. Hence, the ulti-
mate effect of the court's holding may include greater friction in
minority communities.
Obviously, the reduced standard also will have the intended ef-
fect of increasing the number of arrests. One must decide, how-
ever, if the benefits gained by granting greater freedom to police
officers to investigate crime outweigh the detrimental effects on
personal liberty and community harmony. To this end it is note-
worthy that the reduced standard will result primarily in the im-
proved detection of minor crimes.'28 Police rarely encounter
felony suspects without the benefit of a complaining witness; al-
most all police-initiated encounters involve misdemeanors." It
would appear on this account, then, that the losses to society re-
123. 407 U.S. at 146. In Adams the Court observed that "It]his is a stronger
case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip." Id.
124. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125. State In Interest of H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 773 (N.J. 1977).
126. 392 U.S. at 14 n.11. The Terry Court recognized that street interroga-
tions and stop and frisks often are misused by police, particularly to harass
youths and minority groups. Id.
127. See Comment, supra note 2, at 432.
128. Bogomolny, Street Partol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 CRIM. L.
BULL. 544, 551-52 (1976).
129. Id. at 551.
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sulting from greater numbers of intrusive conduct will exceed
the losses society would suffer by criminal conduct which could
otherwise go undetected. The words of Justice Handler of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey are compelling:
Where intrusive police action is countenanced without ... founda-
tions and rationalized only upon an apprehension of crime in gen-
eral, then every citizen, regardless of personal circumstances be-
comes a convenient object of distrust and wariness, a handy target
of the police. Such an approach may indeed reduce lawlessness,
thwart violence and increase security. But it will accomplish that
at the expense of countless numbers of law abiding and blameless
people, who will be exposed needlessly to intrusive harassment
and the consequent diminution of their personal freedom and indi-
vidual dignity."
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should reverse the super-
ior court's erosion of citizens' fourth amendment rights and liber-
ties by discarding the imprudent and unconstitutional intermedi-
ate response doctrine. In so doing, the supreme court should
begin to adopt stop and frisk guidelines consistent with Terry
and Adams to enable law enforcement personnel of the Common-
wealth to develop lawful procedures for criminal investigation.
Such guidelines should also prevent lower courts from evolving
interpretive abuses of the nature of the intermediate response
doctrine.
The Pennsylvania legislature should also take steps to provide
a semblance of order to this disorderly area of the law.131 The
legislature could adopt stop and frisk standards found in the
American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure'32 or the Model Rules for Law Enforcement: Stop and Frisk."
130. 381 A.2d at 772 (Handler, J., dissenting).
131.
There would be considerable merit in barring the police from employing
stop and frisk for minor crimes like possession of narcotics in order to
remove the temptation from the police to go on fishing expeditions for
contraband. This may be the kind of limitation which cannot easily be
drawn as a matter of fourth amendment interpretation, but it could readi-
ly be imposed by state legislation designed to prevent stop and frisk from
becoming 'stop and fish.'
LaFave, supra note 6, at 65-66.
132. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975).
133. MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: STOP AND FRISK (College of
Law, Arizona State University and Police Foundation, 1974).
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Either code would provide the police officers of this Common-
wealth clear guidelines for performing their duties. At the same
time, the legislature would be providing the citizens of Penn-
sylvania with greater assurance that their fourth amendment
rights will be protected and respected.
